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Abstract
In the United States, approximately 95% of all criminal cases end in guilty pleas. Many
scholars are concerned with plea bargaining’s potential to be coercive, and cite data on
wrongful convictions as proof that an innocence problem exists. Estimates of false guilty
pleas may range between 18 and 27 percent, though a true base rate is difficult to
establish. Using vignettes, I examined the effects of guilt, trial penalty and plea discount
size on plea decisions of adult participants recruited online through TurkPrime. Guilt was
the strongest predictor of plea acceptance, but guilty plea rates increased for all
participants with increasing discount and decreasing trial penalty, and the rate of false
guilty pleas reached 18% in some conditions. Results are discussed in the context of the
psychology of human decision making and in terms of their implications for public
policy.
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How Big is Too Big? The Potentially Coercive Effects of Plea Discount on
Innocent Defendants
Of the many rights and protections afforded to Americans under the Constitution,
few are as well-known by the typical American as those that attach to individuals who are
accused of crimes. Procedural rights, such as the right to avoid self-incrimination or the
right to a public trial, serve to protect criminal defendants in legal proceedings from
government overreach, unjust punishments or unfair outcomes. Nonetheless, the vast
majority of criminal defendants agree to plead guilty to their charges, effectively waiving
many of these protections (Dervan, 2012; Ex Parte Tuley, 2002). Most commonly, this
happens in the context of plea agreements, wherein defendants trade the right to trial in
exchange for more lenient sentencing (Covey, 2007; Edkins & Dervan, 2012). Although
this means foregoing the chance of being acquitted, plea bargains involve certain, and
usually less severe, outcomes that may be appealing to defendants who are facing a risky
trial with poor or uncertain odds of acquittal (Dervan, 2012; Ex Parte Tuley, 2002).
Plea bargaining in the United States dates back to the 1780s, though it was not
until the latter part of the 20th century that it was officially sanctioned by the Supreme
Court of the United States. In its landmark case Brady v. United States (1970), the Court
opined that offering a discounted sentence to a defendant who was willing to plead guilty
was permissible in cases with a strong likelihood of conviction, as long as the proffered
leniency was not so large as to be coercive. The court saw plea bargaining as a mutually
beneficial exchange whereby the defendant receives a lighter sentence, and the expedited
return of a guilty plea reduces the load on already scarce court resources. Driven by a
need for quicker convictions and better case management in an overloaded system, plea
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bargaining rapidly became the dominant form of securing a guilty verdict in the U.S.
(Dervan, 2012). By 1980 only 19% of federal criminal cases went to trial and by 2010,
this number had dropped to 3% (Rakoff, 2014).
Despite its popularity, plea bargaining is not without controversy. While plea
bargaining has been criticized for a host of issues (e.g., being largely unregulated, Dripp,
2015; unmerited leniency, Tor, Gazal-Ayal, & Garcia, 2010), recently much attention has
been focused on its potential to be coercive, and by extension, its contribution to
wrongful convictions (e.g., Bibas, 2004; Bushway, Redlich, & Norris, 2014; Covey,
2007; Dervan, 2012). Both field and lab research on false convictions and false guilty
pleas reveal that innocent people do in fact plead guilty, although an estimate of the base
rate of false guilty pleas has been difficult to establish (Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Russano,
Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005). In two recent studies of individuals convicted by
guilty plea, between 18% and 27% claimed that they were innocent (Malloy, 2016;
Zottoli, Daftary-Kapur, Winters, & Hogan, 2016), and 77% of those who pleaded guilty
in the now infamous Rampart, California, “mass exoneration” scandal were factually
innocent (Covey, 2013). As of April 2018, there have been 404 documented exonerations
in the U.S. of persons convicted by guilty plea (The National Registry of Exonerations,
n.d.); “A number”, writes Professor Donald Dripp, “that grows continually” with each
passing month (Dripp, 2015, p. 1360).
Scholars have identified several legal and structural factors that may exert undue
pressure on defendants in the pre-trial process (Bibas, 2004; Covey, 2007; Dripp, 2015).
In an examination of 466 exoneration cases between 1989 and 2011, Gazal-Ayal and Tor
(2012) found that despite a “remarkable reluctance to plea bargain”, innocent defendants
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are willing to acquiesce to offers of leniency, given certain circumstances: (A) when the
chance of conviction is very likely or near certain, (B) when plea discounts are very steep
and lenient, (C) when they are told that capital punishment would follow loss at trial, and
(D) if the defendant had confessed during interrogation prior to plea negotiations (see
also Kassin, Drizin, Grisso, Gudjonsson, Leo, & Redlich, 2010).
Laboratory studies largely mirror these real-world findings (Bordens, 1984;
Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Edkins & Dervan, 2012; Gazal-Ayal & Tor, 2012; Gregory et
al., 1978; Tor et al., 2010). While innocent mock defendants are substantially less likely
to plead guilty, rates of false guilty pleas across laboratory studies range from 10% to
56% (Bordens, 1984; Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Gregory et al., 1978; Russano et al., 2005;
Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016; Tor et al., 2010). In vignette studies, the rate of innocent
pleas has been shown to substantially increase under certain circumstances, such as when
the likelihood of conviction is high (Redlich & Shteynberg, 2016; Tor et al., 2010), when
the plea sentence is sharply discounted from threatened trial penalty (Bordens, 1984),
when incarceration is pitted against probation (Edkins & Dervan, 2013), and when
defendants are “detained” pre-trial (Edkins & Dervan, 2018). Nonetheless, our
understanding of the factors that contribute to false guilty pleas remains quite limited.
The psychology of plea decision making
Perhaps the most significant contribution to our understanding of guilty plea
decisions will come from psychological theories of decision making under conditions of
uncertainty. The leading model of defendant decision making known as the Shadow of
the Trial (or SOT; e.g. Mnookin, & Kornhauser, 1979) is based on the economic theory
of expected utility and posits that a rational defendant should opt to plead guilty if the
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value of a plea deal is less than the expected value of trial (i.e., probability of conviction
times the expected trial penalty). For example, according to this model, a defendant
facing 10 years at trial with an 80% likelihood of conviction, is expected to accept offers
less than 8 years and reject offers that are longer. While this seems intuitive,
psychological research makes clear that human decision making depends not only on
expected utility (outcome benefits) but is influenced by a host of factors such as loss/gain
framing (e.g., Prospect Theory; Kahneman & Tversky, 1979), anchoring effects (Tversky
& Kahneman, 1974) and future discounting that varies over time and outcome
magnitudes (Mukherje, Sahay, Pammi, & Srinivasan, 2017).
Moreover, SOT does not make different predictions for innocent or guilty
defendants. This is problematic in light of research suggesting that innocent people are
subject to several other biases and heuristics that may lead them to approach guilty plea
decisions differently than guilty people; a tendency that has been coined as the
“Innocence Effect” (Gazal-Ayal & Tor, 2012). For example, innocent defendants may
suffer from an “illusion of transparency” (Gilovich, Savitsky, & Medvec, 1998),
believing that their innocence will be self-evident to others, which in turn leads to overly
optimistic appraisals of their odds at trial (Bibas, 2004; Gazal-Ayal & Tor, 2012; Gregory
et al., 1978; Redlich, Bibas, Edkins, & Madon, 2017). As a result, some innocent
defendants may unconsciously ignore base rates of conviction, believing that relative to
others in their situation, a high conviction rate at trial doesn’t apply to them (Redlich et
al., 2017). This over-optimism surrounding one’s chances of acquittal may reflect beliefs
in a “just world”: That is, innocent people believe they will be treated fairly and found
innocent because exculpatory evidence will appear at trial, with sufficient weight to
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vindicate them. Additionally, innocent defendants may fall prey to the availability
heuristic (Bibas, 2004). Essentially, a defendant’s extensive familiarity with his or her
own case and guilt status encourages recalling of evidence that fits with their beliefs
about themselves (Gazal-Ayal & Tor, 2012), which may, in turn, bias their beliefs about
both the strength and type of evidence likely to appear at trial. Finally, the unfairness of
being targeted wrongfully may manifest in what has be referred to as an egocentric bias,
or a tendency to think that one deserves better treatment (or a better plea offer) than one
is currently receiving, increasing the likelihood that innocents will refuse to bargain
(Bibas, 2004). These psychological factors, taken together, serve to push innocent
defendants’ decision making towards trials over plea bargains, even when it may not be
in a defendant’s best interest to do so and they would rationally be better off taking a
deal.
This would imply, then, that innocent people are less likely to plead guilty (based
on risk-preference alone), but of course, it is an empirical fact that innocent people do
plead guilty, with some studies estimating rates of false guilty pleas that are alarmingly
high (Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Edkins & Dervan, 2018). Clearly, as Gazal-Ayal and Tor
(2012) assert, the Innocence Effect has definite limits.
Covey (2007) and Bibas (2004) point to several structural factors in the legal
process that prosecutors can (and often do) leverage to increase a defendant’s willingness
to plead, resulting in plea deals may become coercive enough to substantially increase the
likelihood that innocents will plead guilty (Dervan, 2012; Gazal-Ayal & Tor, 2012). One
such tactic, known as overcharging, is to threaten higher trial penalties to make plea
offers seem especially lenient by comparison (Covey, 2007; Gazal-Ayal & Tor, 2012;
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Kim, 2015). Research has shown that more charges and higher severity of charges may
increase the perception by a defendant that conviction at trial is certain and the loss
would be substantial (Gregory et al., 1978; Tor 2010). Despite the Brady court’s
acknowledgement that discount size could be potentially coercive for an innocent
defendant, the Court has not defined exactly just how big a discrepancy would need to be
before it becomes coercive. In Bordenkircher v. Hayes (1978) the Supreme Court upheld
the constitutionality of the substantial sentencing disparity between a life sentence (at
trial) and five-years in prison (in exchange for a guilty plea), ruling that enhanced trial
sentences are permissible to persuade defendants to plead guilty, as long as the charges
were permissible by law given the fact of the case (Bordenkircher v. Hayes, 1978).
The lack of clear or consistent guidelines from the courts on the acceptable sizes
of plea discounts, combined with the nearly unfettered charging discretion of prosecutors,
has resulted in offers of leniency that many are concerned can be coercive (Dervan, 2012;
Dripp, 2015). Archival sentencing data reveal that defendants receive average discounts
of 39% at the Federal level, and as high as nearly 60% in some specific cases (Kim,
2014); similar studies at the state level reveal steeper discounts still (Redlich, Yan, &
Bushway, 2017; Ulmer & Bradly, 2006). Importantly, archival research compares actual
plea sentences with actual trial sentences across similar cases, and as a result do not
necessarily capture the threat of trial sentence that defendants face in the context of plea
negotiations, which may be quite a bit higher. For example, interviews with individuals
who pleaded guilty to felonies in NYC and were asked about the sentences they were told
they could receive if convicted at trial revealed average discounts in excess of 80%
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(Zottoli et al., 2016), a number that Russell Covey (2007) writes may be “…common, if
not routine” (p. 227).
Overcharging may invite exploitation of the anchoring and adjustment heuristic,
as initial sentences offered by the prosecution may serve as a reference point for
defendants against which they judge all subsequent offers (Bibas, 2004). That is, a
defendant may (unconsciously) use initial offers by the prosecution as a baseline for
determining the fairness of a subsequent offer (Covey, 2007). While effective at getting
guilty people to plead guilty, overcharging may also overcome innocent defendants’
natural aversion to pleading guilty by making losses at trial appear too “catastrophic” to
be worth the risk (Dripp, 2015). Indeed, Kim (2015) argues that that given the high
discrepancies between trial and plea penalties, “…very few defendants can rationally
choose to exercise their constitutional right to trial” (p. 1249).
Importantly, threat of trial penalty is only one side of the coin. A plea offer, by
definition, involves a reduction (or “discount”) from some threatened charge. The rate of
this discount may be important on its own, or its importance may be moderated by the
magnitude of the trial penalty threat. That is, the discrepancy between penalty offered in
exchange for a guilty plea and the penalty threatened should the defendant lose may bear
most strongly on the decision to plead guilty (Covey, 2007), and innocent defendants
may be at greatest risk when deep discounts are combined with substantial overcharging
(Dervan, 2012; Gregory et al., 1978; Kim, 2015). It’s also possible that once a certain
threshold of discount size or sentence disparity is reached, the benefits of the plea deal
will always outweigh the risks associated with losing at trial, regardless of a defendant’s
factual guilt or innocence (Dervan & Edkins, 2013). Professor Dripp (2015) writes that
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the combined use of high trial penalties and deep discounts results in guilty pleas with
such sizable sentencing discrepancies, that they are “constitutionally indistinguishable”
from coerced confessions. In the face of absurd trial penalties, defendants may be too
afraid to invoke their rights to trial when a deeply discounted offer is an available
alternative (Dripp, 2015, p. 1364).
Laboratory research on the effects of trial penalty and plea discount is nascent,
and findings have been inconsistent across studies, reflecting differences in
methodologies (e.g., vignette versus in vivo), populations studied, sizes of
penalties/discounts used and context/severity of crimes. The most consistent finding,
perhaps unsurprisingly, is that guilty participants plead guilty substantially more often
than the innocent, and that willingness to plead guilty among guilty participants increases
with increasing trial penalty and discount (Bordens, 1984; Gregory et al., 1978; Redlich
& Shteynberg, 2016). These effects are less consistently reported for innocent
participants, however, most studies have been successful at compelling guilty pleas from
innocent participants under conditions of increasing threat of trial penalty (Bordens,
1984; Edkins & Dervan, 2013; Edkins & Dervan, 2018; Gregory et al., 1978; Redlich &
Shteynberg, 2016; Russano et al., 2005; Tor et al., 2010).
While this research base is growing, researchers have yet to arrive at an answer
for how big is too big? and significant questions remain as to the exact point at which
sentencing disparities get coercive enough to influence a false guilty plea (Dervan &
Edkins, 2013). Furthermore, it is also unknown if high trial penalties and steep plea
discounts, particularly when combined, can become so extreme as to make innocent
defendants equally, or nearly equally, likely to plead guilty as guilty defendants. It is
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possible that trial penalty and discount can combine in such a way that once a certain
disparity is reached, there is a sudden and “overwhelming” influence on the defendant to
plead guilty (Dervan & Edkins, 2013).
The present study
In the current study, I examine the effect of plea discount and sentence disparity
on defendants’ plea decisions, in an attempt to establish the “breaking point” at which
plea acceptance rates among innocent and guilty mock defendants begin to converge.
Importantly, if sentencing differentials are driving plea acceptance rates, it will be helpful
to examine whether the effects are due to the relative discount, the absolute sentencing
difference or some combination of the two. As noted above, although discount rates and
sentence disparities both represent changes in the size of a sentence, it is important to
consider each separately, as they may evoke different psychological responses. To
illustrate, consider two defendants who are offered 50% sentence reductions, one of
whom is facing 20 years and the other 10. Assuming all else (e.g., conviction likelihood)
is equal, it is yet unknown if these defendants would be equally likely to accept or reject
their offers, despite SOT predictions that they would. To my knowledge, there has been
no prior effort to examine these relationships systematically and such data have clear
policy implications.
To establish if, and under what conditions, guilty and innocent plea rates will
converge, I manipulated guilt status, plea discount rate, and trial penalty and examined
their independent and interactive effects on plea acceptance rates.
Hypotheses
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I expected that guilty participants would be more likely than innocent to plead
guilty overall, and that plea acceptance rates would increase with both increasing trial
penalty and increasing plea discount. Based on the results of a pilot study with 489
Montclair State University undergraduate students in which I examined the effects of
guilt (guilty/innocent), discount size (.2/.5/.7) and trial penalty (5/10/20/25-years) on
likelihood to accept a plea offer, I also anticipated that plea discount would be the
strongest predictor of plea decisions for all participants, and would potentially have a
stronger effect than trial penalty. This study is designed to examine interactions between
guilt and trial penalty and guilt and discount size, but, no a priori hypotheses as to the
point at which guilty and innocent participant’s plea acceptance rates will converge are
proposed and post-hoc corrections will be employed for analyses of any significant
interactions. I also collected data on confidence in and rationales for plea decisions, but
these data will only be reported descriptively.
Method
Participants
The sample comprised 1,551 participants recruited through TurkPrime (Prime
Research Solutions, 2018). Registration was limited to those who passed exclusion
criteria. Namely, these were being at least 18 years of age or older at the time they signed
up, being fluent in English, and residing in the United States. Additionally, those
individuals who had previously participated in a similar guilty plea decision making
study conducted by our lab were also excluded.
All participants who successfully completed the survey and passed all qualifying
and attention-check questions were compensated for their time with $1, paid through
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TurkPrime. In total, 584 participants were disqualified for failing attention checks or not
completing all relevant survey questions. The final sample comprised 996 participants1.
The mean age was 38.8 (SD = 11.1). Fifty percent of the sample identified as male.
Seventy-nine percent of the sample identified as Caucasian, 9.5% as Black or African
American, 7.42% Asian, and 3.1% other. Six percent of the sample identified as
Hispanic.
Procedure
All data for this study were collected through an online survey hosted by
Qualtrics, Inc. (2018). Participant data was collected from January 5th through January
13th, 2018. Eligible participants were recruited through TurkPrime where they obtained a
link to the online survey. The link directed participants to an informed consent page,
which was followed by a short four-item demographic survey. After being told that the
study entailed imagining themselves as a college student who was charged with a drug
crime, participants were asked how difficult it would be for them to do so. Any
participant responding “Very difficult” or “Difficult” were disqualified from the study.
Qualified participants were randomly assigned to one of 12 experimental conditions.
After being assigned to a condition, participants received a short vignette, written
in the 2nd person perspective, and were asked to imagine themselves as the main character
in the story. Participants were asked three comprehension-check questions and then
presented with a decision-making survey. When participants reached the end of the
survey, they received a unique code to enter on TurkPrime to receive compensation. This

1

Based on expectations of small to moderate effects (depending upon condition & reflecting results of
prior research), the planned sample size was 1200 (100 per condition). The final sample size fell somewhat
short (approx. 83 per cell).
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study was approved by the Montclair State University IRB on September 13, 2017 (IRBFY17-18-723).
Materials
Demographics Survey. Participants were asked to provide their age, sex, race,
and ethnicity.
Vignettes and Manipulations. Each participant read a vignette in which they
were cast as a defendant charged with a campus-based drug offense. Vignettes varied
according to guilt of the defendant (Guilty/Innocent), the penalty faced at trial (5 years /
25 years), and the sentence discount offered by the prosecutor through a plea deal (20% /
50% / 70%). The middle Trial Penalty conditions (10 years and 20 years) were excluded
from the main study for this thesis, because of the weaker observed effects in these
conditions in the pilot study. This reduced the number of levels for this variable from four
to two, resulting in a 2X2X3 between-subjects design for the main study. All participants
were randomly assigned their guilt status, trial penalty, and discount size. To maintain
external validity of trial/plea penalties, the amount of the drug found by authorities in the
vignettes varied with trial/plea penalties, according to the laws of the state of New Jersey
(where this study took place). This design allowed for evaluation of the relative impact of
trial penalty and discount while controlling for the (certain) plea sentence.
Examples of a guilty and an innocent vignette are provided in Appendix A. The text
that was altered across penalty and discount conditions is highlighted in bold font, and
the sample vignettes are followed by the text manipulations for the other conditions.
Dependent Variables. After reading the vignette and answering comprehension
questions, participants were asked to indicate whether or not they would accept the deal

THE COERCIVE EFFECTS OF PLEA DISCOUNT

13

or proceed to trial; this is a dichotomously scored variable. Participates were also asked
to rate their confidence in their decision on a 6-point Likert-type item, ranging from
Extremely Unsure to Extremely Sure. Finally, participants were asked to select from a list
of possible reasons for their decision to accept or reject their deals. Available options for
rationales differed slightly depending guilt status and participant choice to accept or
reject the deal. For example, the rationale “I pleaded guilty because I was guilty” was not
presented to innocent participants who accepted their deals, and “I pleaded not guilty
because I am not guilty” was not presented to the guilty participants who rejected their
deals. Participants had the option to select “None of the above” and to provide an
alternative reason. Rationales offered to participants, by condition, are presented in
Appendix B.
Planned Analyses
Logistic regression analyses were run to evaluate the main and interactive effects
of guilt status, discount and trial penalty on plea acceptance rates, above and beyond the
effect of demographic variables. Participants who did not complete the full survey (i.e.,
surveys with missing data) will be excluded from the analysis. Data on participant
confidence and decision rationales will be presented descriptively.
Results
Statistical Model
Hierarchical binomial logistic regression analyses were performed to test the
effects of the manipulations on plea acceptance rates, above and beyond any effects of
demographic differences (i.e., sex, race, ethnicity and age). For model parsimony, the
Race categories of Asian and Other were collapsed into Other non-White and the Gender
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categories of Other (n=3) and Female were analyzed as a single category Female. Model
assumptions regarding collinearity were confirmed by near-zero correlations among the
covariates. Odds ratios and their respective confidence intervals (at 95%) are reported.
Demographic Predictors of Plea Decisions
Gender and race were significantly associated with plea acceptance rates in a
demographics-only model, but their overall contribution was small, Model χ2 (5, N= 996)
= 12.858, p= .025, Negalkerke R2=.18, and only gender remained significant after
accounting for the independent variables. Specifically, females were 1.38 times more
likely to accept plea deals than men, Wald χ2(1, N= 996) = 4.19, p= .041, CI for odds
ratio: 1.1 - 1.89.
Guilt, Discount and Trial Penalty
As shown in Table 1, plea acceptance rates were higher for guilty participants,
and increased substantially for all participants with increasing plea discount. Plea
acceptance rates were also associated with trial penalty, though contrary to expectations,
overall acceptance rates were higher in the low trial penalty condition, all effects appear
to be stronger for guilty than innocent participants.
Table 1 about here
Accordingly, adding the three IVs into the logistic regression significantly
increased predictive utility of the model above the contribution of the demographic
variables alone, Δχ2= 306.13; p<.001; Negalkerke R2= .38, yielding an overall
classification rate of 76.5%. Guilty participants were 11.65 times more likely than
Innocents to accept the plea deal, Wald χ2 (1, N= 996) = 193.34, p= <.001, CI for odds
ratio: 8.25-16.48. Regardless of guilt, participants in the Low Trial Penalty condition
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were 1.4 times as likely to accept the plea deal, Wald χ2(1, N= 996) =9.52, p= .002, CI
for odds ratio: 1.17 - 1.56, and relative to the lowest discount condition, participants in
the 50% discount condition were 3.4 times more like to accept the deal. Interaction terms
were non-significant and did not improve the model2.

Table 2 about here

Confidence in Decision
In general, the confidence of innocent defendants who accepted their plea offers
increased with increasing plea discount and was unaffected by trial penalty. The
confidence of guilty participants and of innocent participants who rejected their offers
were unaffected by the manipulations. The overall means for innocent defendant’s
confidence was 4.0, and the overall mean for guilty defendant’s confidence was 4.3;
resulting in a total sample mean of 4.1 across all participants. Table 2 provides the means
for plea acceptors and rejecters, by experimental condition.
Table 2 about here
Rationales
Innocent and Guilty participants differed in the rationales they selected for their
plea decisions. Among individuals who accepted their plea offers, guilty participants
were more likely than innocent to endorse the utilitarian rationale “To get less time”
(30% of guilty acceptors; 22% of innocent); whereas, innocent participants were more

2

Although descriptive data shows a stronger effect of trial penalty for guilty participants, this interaction
was not significant. and its presence in the model did not improve prediction. However, given our sample
size, it is possible that the substantially skewed proportions (i.e., many more guilty participants pleaded
guilty than innocent) may have limited our power to detect this effect.
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likely to cite concerns about the uncertainty of trial (71% of innocent; 40% of guilty).
Similarly, among the participants who rejected their offers, guilty participants were more
likely to cite facts related to their case (e.g. “less time was not enough incentive”, Guilty
= 31.44%, Innocent=11.88%; “The evidence was weak”, Guilty = 27.84%, Innocent=
6.59%); while innocent participants instead emphasized their factual innocence (68%).
Discussion
This study utilized vignettes to examine the impact of guilt status, trial penalty,
and discount size on mock-defendants’ plea choices. All independent variables had
significant main effects on acceptance decisions. Consistent with a wide body of
literature (Bordens, 1984; Dervan & Edkins, 2013; Edkins & Dervan, 2012; Gregory et
al., 1978; Zottoli et al., 2016), guilty participants pleaded guilty at higher rates than
innocent, but, remarkably, I obtained acceptance rates of 18% among innocent
participants in the 5-year/70% discount condition. As hypothesized, discount size was the
driving factor in plea decisions for both innocent and guilty participants, but while trial
penalty also had an effect on decisions, contrary to our expectations, the guilty plea rate
was higher in the 5-year condition. In the following sections I outline the implications of
these findings and how they may prove informative to current policy.
Discounts
Although I did not find a point where the plea rates of innocent and guilty
defendants converged, I found that the higher the discount, the more likely anyone was to
plead guilty. Upping discount sizes from 20% to 50% resulted in an alarming nine-fold
increase in the number of false guilty pleas in the five-year condition, and a five-fold
increase in the twenty-five-year condition. Considering these effects were found in a
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vignette study, it is likely that the real-world effects of discount are even stronger still;
and by proxy, that the plea rates here could be a conservative underestimate. Also,
although the vignettes used crimes and penalties consistent with NJ laws, most
participants would be unfamiliar with the severity of sentences attached to drug crimes.
They may therefore think their sentences (particularly in the high trial penalty condition)
are unrealistic or unfair, despite being legally supported by Federal policy; thus further
depressing the rate of guilty pleas. The Court in Brady deemed offers of leniency
permissible in cases with strong evidence of guilt, insofar as those offers were not so
lenient as to overwhelm defendants’ free choice, or “substantially increase” the likelihood
of false guilty pleas (Dervan, 2012, p. 87-88). Although the Brady court does not specify
the size of a discount that would tip the scales, it seems reasonable to consider a 9-fold
increase as substantial (see also Dervan, 2012, for similar comment).
This naturally leads one to the question; if discounts are so influential, how big a
discount is too big to be declined by a rational defendant? The answer may depend on
more variables than discount alone. Human decision making is often determined by how
the outcome is framed (i.e., either as a gain or a loss relative to their current
circumstances), and the expected probability for the occurrence of said outcome (Tversky
& Khaneman, 1974). At least two studies have shown that plea decisions are influenced
according to the chance of conviction occurring (which changes risk-preference) (Bartlett
& Zottoli, 2018; Tor et al., 2010); and a recent study found that pre-trial detention can
flip a plea bargain’s loss-frame into a gain frame, making innocent people twice as likely
to plead guilty when compared to bargaining from a position of freedom (Edkins &
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Dervan, 2018). Furthermore, as I show here, the effect of discount may depend on the
size of the trial penalty to which it is applied.
Trial Penalty
The second hypothesis in this study predicted that an anchoring and adjustment
bias would result in increased plea acceptances in the 25-year trial penalty condition
relative to the 5-year. Essentially, the large initial threat of a high trial sentence would
make losses more extreme and plea bargains seem fairer by comparison, increasing (as
prior studies suggested) the belief by the defendant that conviction was likely (Gregory et
al., 1978; Tor et al., 2010). Somewhat unexpectedly, I found the opposite to be true. The
lower trial penalty condition had equal or higher rates of acceptance for both guilty and
innocent participants. This resembles the findings of Bartlett & Zottoli (2018), who also
discovered that lower trial penalty conditions were associated with higher rates of deal
acceptance.
One possible explanation for this is that participants are more likely to plead to a
sentence that they can realistically imagine or conceptualize. Defendants may not be able
to imagine what life would be like past a certain number of years, or what spending a
longer time (7.5 years for example) in prison might be like, as opposed to a shorter period
(e.g. 2.5 years). This effect may be explained by hyperbolic discounting (Seinstra, Sellitto
& Kalenscher, 2018; see also Edkins & Dervan, 2018 for a discussion of hyperbolic
discounting in the context of guilty pleas). Hyperbolic discounting describes the way we
subjectively assign value to potential rewards, with those that are attainable at a period
closer in time being valued more highly than those farther in the future, and over a "nonconstant decay rate" (Seinstra et al., 2018). In my study, the reward of freedom
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necessitates one completing a period of incarceration to obtain it; and the longer it takes
to get said reward/freedom, the less subjective value it may hold for the defendant. Thus,
steep discounts may hold less subjective value in high penalty conditions because the
delay in time to obtain the same reward (i.e., freedom) is very long, relative to the lower
penalty conditions. Essentially, there is a diminishing rate of return for discount size as
trial penalties become higher. To wit, the 50% discount reduces a 5-year penalty to only
2.5 years, while the same discount in the 25-year penalty would still leave the participant
in incarcerated for more than a decade. By extension, it is possible that exorbitant trial
penalties increase risk-seeking in defendants, particularly in the guilty, who tend to be
more risk-averse on average. As penalties get higher and losses more severe, defendants
will be less likely to see their deal as a “gain” relative to the punishment they would
receive if they risked conviction. As a result, they may be more willing to risk a chance at
freedom than take a reduced but still undesirably long sentence. Regardless, the results in
this study point towards lower trial penalty cases as an area of heightened sensitivity to
discounts for all defendants. Although this study examined felony convictions,
misdemeanor cases are those most likely to involve smaller trial penalties. In these
misdemeanor cases, a partial answer to how big is too big may be smaller discounts than
were anticipated.
Guilt Status
Finally, consistent with nearly all research on guilty pleas (e.g., Edkins & Dervan,
2018; Gazal-Ayal & Tor, 2012; Gregory et al., 1978), actual guilt proved to be the most
significant predictor of deal acceptance in this study. Guilty participants were more than
11 times as likely as innocent participants to plead guilty. Nonetheless, nearly 12% of the
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innocent defendants in our study pleaded guilty, and in some conditions the rate of
innocent pleas reached 18%, providing further evidence that the Innocence Effect has its
limits (Bibas, 2004; Gazal-Ayal & Tor, 2012). An examination of our participants’
decision rationales supports this: Innocent participants who rejected deals, were
overwhelmingly more likely to say they did so because they were factually innocent,
whereas guilty participants cited fact-specific concerns about their case. However, when
innocent defendants pleaded guilty, their rationales reflected that they were afraid to lose
at trial, suggesting that the effect of the discount was able to overpower the cognitive
biases behind the Innocence Effect. This is further supported by data from the
confidence measure: As innocent participants faced steeper and steeper discounts, those
that accepted their deals grew more confident in their decisions. Combined with the
substantial increase in acceptance rates as discounts rose, the fact that innocent
participants become more confident in their decision to plead guilty further affirms that
even the innocent are not altogether immune to the lure of a steep discount. As research
continues to find ways in which innocent and guilty defendants differ from one another,
newer models may be needed in order to better account for the differences in the ways
these defendants approach their decisions and think about their cases.
Implications
The main findings of this study point to discounts as significant drivers of plea
deal acceptance, second only to guilt status. Importantly, even innocent defendants were
not immune to high discounts and showed considerable hikes in plea acceptance as
discounts got more lenient. Thus, a prosecutor’s ability to overcharge defendants to
enable use of higher and more lenient discount sizes during plea negotiations may be a
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coercive tactic. Lower trial penalties also had a significant impact on acceptance, with
lower levels increasing acceptance rates. Given this study’s finding on the strong
influence of discounts in producing guilty pleas, and replicating Bartlett & Zottoli’s
(2017) findings on lower penalties increasing acceptance, this naturally leads to the
question: How voluntary are the pleas being entered by defendants who are faced with
such conditions? The significance of these findings cannot be overstated. If we are to
reduce the number of false guilty pleas occurring- and involuntary pleas for defendants in
general- it is most important to examine discount size restrictions in misdemeanor cases,
where both conditions are most frequently present. The lower threatened penalties in
misdemeanor cases may exacerbate the effects of discounting, and the dual combination
of low-penalty/high-discount may put innocent defendants at increased risk of pleading
guilty. Public policy should take into account defendant’s higher sensitivity to discount in
lower trial penalty cases and the potential for involuntary pleas that this creates.
Study Limitations
Several limitations exist in the current study (e.g., our sample was not drawn from
a population of individuals who are involved in the criminal justice system), but, by far
the most important limitation is the study’s use of vignette. Vignette studies sacrifice
external validity in order to maximize internal validity and control over the independent
variables of interest. The choices that participants made in our vignettes will vary in real
life due to confounding variables both realistically and ethically beyond our control in the
laboratory, such as the drawn-out nature of legal proceedings, the stress of being indicted
and facing real jail/prison time, having to pay for lawyers, missing work or other
obligations to attend trial and legal proceedings, and so forth. Stress alone is a significant
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variable in decision making that limits attention to fewer cues and narrows one’s
consideration of possible outcomes (Galván & Rahdar, 2013). Relying on participant’s
ability to imagine the situation cannot match a paradigm that replicates the scenario in
some fashion (see Russano, Meissner, Narchet, & Kassin, 2005). An additional threat to
study validity was a lack of exclusion criteria based on completion time and relying on
attention-check questions to catch non-effortful responses. By not eliminating responses
that were much faster the sample average or the expected completion time I was able to
analyze all of our completed response data, but respondents seeking to finish the study
quickly without fully considering the questions therein may have altered results.
Future Directions
The central aim of this study was to discover if it is discount sizes, trial penalties,
or the combined effects of both that are driving the acceptance of plea bargains. Future
studies will seek to replicate and expand on the results here in several key areas,
including: (a) how different developmental stages moderate the observed effects, (b) how
cognitive processing style (e.g., Fuzzy Trace Theory; Brainerd & Reyna, 1990; Corbin,
Reyna, Weldon, & Brainerd, 2015) may affect how participants make comparative
evaluations of sentences pre-trial, (c) how discount effects are moderated by strength of
evidence and beliefs about conviction likelihood, (d) how defendants estimate their odds
to win at trial and how this affects plea acceptance rates, and (e) how vignette studies
might be improved (e.g., use of crime types that more realistically supports the high trial
penalty condition).
While I did not find a condition wherein innocent and guilty plea acceptance rates
converged, the development of experimental conditions that better reflect the factors that
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are most salient to defendants in the plea negotiation process may help us hone in on the
conditions that put innocent defendants at greatest risk. An important consideration to be
explored in future studies is how the specific sizes of plea sentence outcomes and
sentencing differentials are affecting plea acceptance rates. Extant literature suggests that
as the size of sentencing disparities created by discounts grows larger and the gap widens
between the plea bargain and trial penalty, plea acceptance will rise (Dervan & Edkins,
2013). However, it is still unknown how defendants are comparing their sentences and
from where the discounts in our study drew their power: is it the absolute number of
years that is saved by pleading (or conversely, served by pleading) or the meaning
attached to the discount irrespective of the absolute sentence reduction in years. For
instance, a thought based on the former could look like “I will spend 5 years in prison if
I plead, as opposed to losing 10 if convicted.” A thought considering only the meaning
behind the discount however may look like “I will spend half as much time in prison if I
plead”. Future studies should explore what happens to rates of acceptance with pleas of
the same magnitude (e.g. 5 years in prison) as it changes from “half as much time”
relative to the trial penalty, to “a little less” or “substantially less” time. On the flip side
of the same coin, the absolute differences between sentence reductions should be
examined in the same manner; in other words, does a plea deal that is 3.5 years less than
the trial sentence produce a similar rate of acceptance to a deal that is 5 years less than
the trial sentence, regardless of initial trial penalty size? Given that I reported increased
plea acceptance in lower trial penalty conditions, I suspect it will be the floor (that is, the
value of the plea sentence) that will drive decisions, but to date, no study has
systematically tested these relationships. No such comparisons could be made in the
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current study, as only one condition enabled a comparison of like-reductions in years-off
trial penalty and no conditions resulted in equivalent plea sentences. The weight that
participants place on one or the other has important implications for the influence of
discount and discrepancy sizes, and consequently, where the more coercive deals might
be encountered.
Theories on cognitive processing style might be useful in helping us study these
effects. For example, Fuzzy Trace Theory (Brainerd & Reyna, 1990) postulates that
people encode and process information in two primaries ways: the first (typically found
in younger populations) is a more literal, verbatim encoding of exact details, while the
second way (typically found in more developmentally advanced populations) focuses
only on the underlying gist meaning of a situation. Relying on this theoretical backdrop,
I may be able to experimentally shift defendants’ focus away from discounts (the “half as
much” type-thought that makes one sentence relative to another) and instead focus on the
total amount in years; this may invert our finding that lower trial penalty conditions elicit
more pleas by giving more power to the higher disparity window only possible in higher
trial penalty conditions (e.g. 70% off of 25= 17.5 year difference; 70% off of 5= 3.5 year
difference). Helm and colleagues recently did something similar, and found that offering
categorically different sentences (i.e. a misdemeanor vs. a felony charge) increased
willingness to plead guilty among participants relying on gist-processing (Helm & Reyna,
2017). While they did not find a difference in pleading preference due to a sentencing
differential, they note this may have been because of their comparatively small disparity;
and they go on to suggest that larger, “non-trivial” sentencing differentials (such as in the
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present study) may produce stronger, categorical distinctions between sentences, and thus
raise likelihood to plead guilty (Helm & Renya, 2017, p. 10).
Conclusion
In Brady the Supreme Court opined that should plea bargains become powerful
enough to influence innocent defendants to plead guilty, plea bargaining’s
constitutionality should be questioned. Today, research is clear in that innocent people do
plead guilty, and that there are a host of psychological and structural-legal factors that
may be to blame (Covey, 2007; Bibas, 2004; Tor et al., 2010). This study found that, as
scholars have warned, the size of plea discounts is a powerful contributor to plea
acceptance, carrying the ability to markedly increase willingness to plead guilty among
both the guilty and the innocent. Steep discounts created substantial increases in plea
acceptance, with nearly a fifth of innocents in high discount conditions willing to plead
guilty. Moreover, as discounts rose, innocent participants who accepted their deals got
more confident that they were making the right choice. Lower trial penalties exacerbated
these effects, suggesting that the innocent are most at risk of pleading guilty in
misdemeanor cases where lower penalties are routine and discounts may be higher. The
assumption by the Court in Bordenkircher that rational defendants would not falsely
condemn themselves does not seem to hold: When a strong resistance to bargaining can
be flipped into confident acceptance, it may be time to admit the “Brady safety-valve”
(Dervan, 2012) has failed and we need to reexamine the permissible sizes of discounts
and penalties that are wielded against defendants.
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Appendix A
Innocent / High Trial Penalty / High Discount condition

You are a senior in college and you live in a dorm room on campus. Your roommate has
ADHD and takes a medication called Adderall. Three weeks ago you told an acquaintance
that he could probably talk to your roommate about how to get a prescription for
Adderall.
What you did not know, is that your roommate had actually been selling Adderall on campus
for the past year.
A week later you lost your job and your roommate told you about his drug operation. He said
he would cut you in if you referred buyers to him.
You said “Absolutely not.”
Last week, after receiving a tip from an informant, officers raided your dorm room and found
five filled prescription bottles of Adderall (about 175 pills).
You and your roommate were both arrested.
Your acquaintance will testify in court that you told him he could buy Adderall from your
roommate.
You explained to the officers that you did tell your acquaintance that he could talk to your
roommate about how he could get a prescription for the drug, but you did not know at the
time that your roommate was a dealer.
The prosecutor, who has been cracking down hard on campus drug cases, has brought charges
against you and your roommate. You are charged as an accomplice. You know that you are
innocent, but you are worried about the evidence against you.
The judge has released you on bail and you are at home awaiting trial. If convicted, you will
receive 25 years in prison. Your attorney has told you that in his experience and based on the
evidence the police have, cases like yours end in guilty verdicts about 75% of the time. In
other words, 7.5 out of ten times, defendants in your position are found guilty at trial and go
to prison for 25 years.
Your attorney told you that the prosecutor is unwilling to reduce your charges, but has offered
you the following plea deal: If you plead guilty to the charges against you, you will go to
prison for only 7 years and 6 months.

Guilty / High Trial Penalty / High Discount condition
You are a senior in college and you live in a dorm room on campus. Your roommate has
ADHD and takes a medication called Adderall.
What you did not know, is that your roommate had actually been selling Adderall on campus
for the past year.
A week later you lost your job and your roommate told you about his drug operation. He said
he would cut you in if you referred buyers to him.

31

THE COERCIVE EFFECTS OF PLEA DISCOUNT

You agreed, and subsequently told an acquaintance that he could probably talk to your
roommate about how to get a prescription for Adderall.
Last week, after receiving a tip from an informant, officers raided your dorm room and found
five filled prescription bottles of Adderall (about 175 pills).
You and your roommate were both arrested.
Your acquaintance will testify in court that you told him he could buy Adderall from your
roommate.
You admitted to the officers that you did tell your acquaintance that he could talk to your
roommate about how he could get a prescription for the drug, but that you didn’t exactly say
that your roommate was a dealer.
The prosecutor, who has been cracking down hard on campus drug cases, has brought charges
against you and your roommate. You are charged as an accomplice. You know that you are
guilty, but you are worried about the evidence against you.
The judge has released you on bail and you are at home awaiting trial. If convicted, you will
receive 25 years in prison. Your attorney has told you that in his experience and based on the
evidence the police have, cases like yours end in guilty verdicts about 75% of the time. In
other words, 7.5 out of ten times, defendants in your position are found guilty at trial and go
to prison for 25 years.
Your attorney told you that the prosecutor is unwilling to reduce your charges, but has offered
you the following plea deal: If you plead guilty to the charges against you, you will go to
prison for only 7 years and 6 months.
Penalty and Discount Manipulations3:
Discount—Low. In the low condition, participants were offered a plea deal that was 20%
lower than their original sentence.
Discount—Medium. In the medium condition, participants were offered a plea deal that was
50% lower than their original sentence.
Discount—High. In the high condition, participants were offered a plea deal that was 70%
lower than their original sentence.
Trial Penalty—Low. “If convicted, you will receive 5 years in prison".
Trial Penalty—High. Participants in the high trial penalty condition are told that “If convicted,
you will receive 25 years in prison".

3

Drug quantities varied from 5 to 175 pills, depending on penalty conditions, as allowed by law.
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Appendix B
Options offered to participants in the guilty condition who accepted offers
To get less time
The evidence was strong
I was afraid to lose at trial
I didn't like the uncertainty associated with going to trial
I knew I would lose at trial
I deserve the punishment
I felt guilty for the crime
Almost everyone gets convicted at trial
I am guilty
Other/None of the above

Options offered to participants in the guilty condition who rejected offers
I pleaded not guilty because less time was not enough incentive
I pleaded not guilty because the evidence was weak
I pleaded not guilty because I was not afraid of losing at trial
I don't mind the uncertainty associated with going to trial
I knew I would win at trial
I do not deserve the punishment
I did not feel guilty for the crime
Almost everyone is found innocent at trial
Other/None of the above

Options offered to participants in the innocent condition who accepted offers
To get less time
The evidence was strong
I was afraid to lose at trial
I didn't like the uncertainty associated with going to trial
I knew I would lose at trial
I deserve the punishment
I felt guilty for the crime
Almost everyone gets convicted at trial
Other/None of the above

33

THE COERCIVE EFFECTS OF PLEA DISCOUNT
Options offered to participants in the innocent condition who rejected offers
I pleaded not guilty because I am not guilty
I pleaded not guilty because less time was not enough incentive
I pleaded not guilty because the evidence was weak
I pleaded not guilty because I was not afraid of losing at trial
I don't mind the uncertainty associated with going to trial
I knew I would win at trial
I do not deserve the punishment
I did not feel guilty for the crime
Almost everyone is found innocent at trial
Other/None of the above
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Table 1a. Logistic regression analysis examining the predictive utility of demographics, Trial
Penalty, Discount, and Guilt for the prediction of plea acceptance
95% Confidence
interval

Wald χ2

Variable

Sig.

Exp (B)

Lower

Step 1: χ = 12.473, Δχ2= 12.473, p< .005, Nagelkerke R =.018
Sex (Female)
7.18
.007
1.44
1.10
Race (White)
6.6
.037
Race (Black)
.75
.386
.86
.51
Race (Other)
5.33
.021
1.63
1.08
Step 2: χ2= 318.873, Δχ2= 306.131, p<.000, Nagelkerke R2= .379
Sex (Female)
4.19
.014
1.39
1.01
Race (White)
5.26
.072
Race (Black)
.30
.581
.86
.498
Race (Other)
4.63
.031
1.74
1.01
Discount (20%)
55.01
<.001
Discount (50%)
34.95
<.001
3.4
2.27
Discount (70%)
50.63
<.001
4.3
2.9
Trial Penalty (25 years)
9.52
.002
.61
.44
Guilt Status (Innocent)
193.3
<.001
11.66
8.25
Note. Step χ2 reflects change from constant-only model; Rows with missing values
indicate the comparison group against which the other variables were judged; Only
significant predictors from demographics-only model were included in Step 1. All
significance tests were two-tailed.
2

Upper

2

1.87
1.3
2.46
1.9
1.48
1.90
5.11
6.51
.83
16.48
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Table 1b. Rates of Plea Acceptance Among Innocent and Guilty Participants by Trial
Penalty and Discount
Five Years
Twenty-Five Years
Total
20%
50%
70%
20%
50%
70%
11.7%
2.40%
18.30%
18.20%
2.50%
10.10%
17.90%
Innocent
56.8%
47.70%
65.10%
75.90%
24.30%
61.90%
59.80%
Guilty
Note. Percentages indicate the total participants in each condition that accepted the deal
offered to them.
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Table 2. Means of participant’s confidence by condition.
Guilty
REJECT ACCEPT
5 years
20%
50%
70%
25
years
20%
50%
70%

Innocent
REJECT ACCEPT

4.2
3.6
4.4

4.5
4.3
4.4

4.8
4.6
4.8

3.0
3.3
4.4

4.7
4.1
4.1

4.5
4.0
4.4

5.3
4.5
4.3

2.0
3.4
3.9

Note. Ratings are from 1 to 6 on a Likert-type item, ranging from Extremely unsure (1)
to Extremely sure (6)

